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Abstract 
 
 
Few microfinance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. 
This paper considers one possible explanation: that the structure of existing 
microfinance contracts may discourage risky but high-expected return investments. 
To explore this possibility, I develop a theory that unifies models of investment 
choice, informal risk sharing, and formal financial contracts. I then test the 
predictions of this theory using a series of experiments with clients of a large 
microfinance institution in India. The experiments confirm the theoretical 
predictions that joint liability creates two inefficiencies. First, borrowers free-ride on 
their partners, making risky investments without compensating partners for this 
risk. Second, the addition of peer-monitoring overcompensates, leading to sharp 
reductions in risk-taking and profitability. Equity-like financing, in which partners 
share both the benefits and risks of more profitable projects, overcomes both of these 
inefficiencies and merits further testing in the field. 
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1 Introduction
In 2005, designated the International Year of Microcreditby the United Nations,
micronance institutions around the world issued approximately 110 million loans
with an average size of $340. The following year, Muhammad Yunus and Grameen
Bank received the Nobel Peace Prize for their e¤orts to eliminate poverty through mi-
crocredit. But while the provision of small, uncollateralized loans to poor borrowers in
poor countries may help alleviate poverty, there is little evidence that micronance-
funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneurship. Few hire employees
outside their immediate families, formalize, or generate sustained capital growth.
This paper considers one possible explanation for this phenomenon: the struc-
ture of existing micronance contracts themselves may discourage risky but high-
expected return investments. Typical micronance contracts produce a tension be-
tween mechanisms that tend to reduce risk-taking, such as peer monitoring, and
those that tend to encourage risk-taking, such as risk-pooling. Much of the theoret-
ical literature has focused on joint liability, a common feature in most micronance
programs, as a means to induce peer monitoring and mitigate ex ante moral hazard
over investment choice (e.g., Stiglitz 1990, Varian 1990, Armendáriz de Aghion and
Morduch 2005, Conning 2005). Under joint liability, small groups of borrowers are
responsible for one anothers loans. If one member fails to repay, all members suf-
fer the default consequences. While this mechanism has been widely credited with
making it possible, indeed protable, to lend to poor borrowers in poor countries,
a growing literature critically explores the relative merits of joint versus individual
liability.1 Indeed, there have long been suspicions that peer monitoring may overcom-
pensate and produce too little risk relative to the social optimum (Banerjee, Besley,
and Guinnane 1994). In particular, joint liability compels individuals to bear the
1When all decisions are taken cooperatively (Ghatak and Guinnane 1999) or when binding ex
ante side contracts are feasible (Rai and Sjöström 2004) these mechanisms are identical; however,
joint liability lending is most prevalent in settings where binding, complete contracts are not feasible.
Madajewicz (2003, 2004) compares individual and group lending directly, focusing on monitoring
costs and the relationship between available loan size and borrower wealth, but this basic comparison
remains di¢ cult to answer empirically. In practice, variation in loan types is likely the product of
selection on unobserved characteristics by either the borrower or the lender. Giné and Karlan (2007)
overcome this limitation with a large, natural eld experiment that randomly assigned individuals
into joint and individual liability loan contracts. They nd no impact of joint liability on repayment
rates and some evidence that individual liability centers generated fewer dropouts and more new
clients.
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cost of their partners project when it fails but does not mandate a compensating
transfer upon success. This creates an incentive to discourage risk taking by others
and thus joint liability may blunt the entrepreneurial tendencies of borrowers.
At the same time, joint liability induces risk pooling not only does the threat of
common default induce income transfers to members su¤ering negative shocks, but
the repeated interactions of micronance borrowers are a natural environment for the
emergence of informal risk sharing. This risk pooling may increase borrowerswill-
ingness to take risk themselves. Moreover, the ability to share risk informally allows
borrowers whose risky projects succeed to compensate their partners for the implicit
insurance provided by joint liability. In doing so, it can mitigate the incentives to
discourage risk taking. It is therefore critical to evaluate the formal contracts in an
environment where informal risk sharing is possible.
To shed light on how micronance contracts a¤ect investment choices, this pa-
per develops a theory that unies models of investment choice, informal risk-sharing
with limited commitment, and formal nancial contracts. It then implements a
corresponding experiment with actual micronance clients in India.
The theory builds on a simple model of informal risk-sharing in the spirit of
Coate and Ravallion (1993) and Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002).2 In this model,
two risk-averse individuals receive a series of income draws subject to idiosyncratic
shocks. In the absence of formal insurance and savings, they enter into an informal
risk-sharing arrangement that is sustained by the expectation of future reciprocity.
I enrich this model by endogenizing the income process, allowing agents to optimize
their investment choices in response to the insurance environment. Contrary to much
of the static investment choice literature in micronance, in this model risky projects
generate higher expected returns than safe projects, reecting the natural assumption
that individuals must be compensated for additional risk with additional returns.3 On
2An extensive empirical literature documents the importance of informal insurance arrangements
as a risk management tool for those who lack access to formal insurance markets (e.g., Townsend
1994, Udry 1994, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, Fernando 2006, Foster and Rosenzweig 2001). Taken as
a whole, the empirical evidence suggests that informal risk coping strategies do not achieve full risk
pooling even though in some cases they perform remarkably well. This paper adds to an emerging
experimental literature (Charness and Genicot 2007, Barr and Genicot 2007, Robinson 2007) that
uses the precise control possible in an experimental setting to understand how such mechanisms
work in practice.
3Following Stiglitz (1990), most theoretical work in micronance has assumed that riskier in-
vestments represent at best a mean-preserving spread of the safer choice and often generated a
lower expected return. Examples include Morduch (1999), Ghatak and Guinnane (1999), and Ar-
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this framework I then overlay formal nancial contracts. I consider in turn individual
liability, joint liability, and an equity-like contract in which all investment returns are
shared equally.
The model illustrates two opposing inuences of joint liability on investment
choice. Mandatory transfers from ones partner encourage greater risk taking by
partially insuring against default. Risk-taking borrowers may compensate their part-
ners for this insurance with increased transfers when risky projects succeed, or they
may free-ride,forcing their partners to insure against default without compensating
transfers. The parallel need to provide this insurance counters the risk-encouragement
e¤ect of receiving it, and relatively risk-averse individuals may elect safer investments
to avoid joint default should their partnersprojects fail.
The theoretical analysis also produces two important supporting results. First,
it demonstrates that joint liability contracts may crowd out informal insurance. By
e¤ectively mandating income transfers to assist loan repayment, joint liability eases
the sting of reversion to autarky and makes cooperation harder to sustain. Second,
informal insurance tends to increase risk taking. Contrary to standard risk-sharing
models, this has the surprising implication that we may nd more informal insurance
among risk-tolerant individuals whose willingness to take riskier investments expands
their scope for cooperation.
While these models o¤er useful insights, in the context of repeated interactions
they produce a multiplicity of equilibria, and theory alone can provide only partial
guidance regarding the likely consequences of informal insurance and formal contracts
for investment behavior. To shed further light on these questions, I conducted a series
of experiments with actual micronance clients in India. The experiments capture
key elements of the theoretical models and the micronance investment decisions they
represent. Based on extensive piloting, I designed the games to be easily understood
by typical micronance clients project choices and payo¤s were presented visually,
all randomizing devices used common items and familiar mechanisms (e.g., guess-
ing which of an experimenters hands held a colored stone), and game money was
physical and conrmed understanding at numerous points throughout the experi-
ment. Individuals were matched in pairs, which dissolved at the end of each round
with a 25% probability in order to simulate a discrete-time, innite-horizon model
with discounting. In each round, subjects could use the proceeds of a loanto invest
mendáriz de Aghion and Gollier (2000).
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in one of several projects that varied according to risk and expected returns. Returns
were determined through a simple randomizing device, after which individuals could
engage in informal risk-sharing by transferring income to their partners. In order to
play in future rounds, subjects needed to repay their loans according to the terms of
a formal nancial contract, which I varied across treatments.
I considered ve contracts: autarky, individual liability, joint liability, joint lia-
bility with a project approval requirement, and an equity-like contract in which all
income was shared equally. Much of the micronance literature assumes a local
information advantage; therefore, to test the role of information, I conducted each
of the treatments under both full information, where all actions and outcomes were
observable, and limited information, where individuals observed only whether their
partner earned su¢ cient income to repay her loan. At the end of the experiment,
one period was randomly selected for cash payment.4
A laboratory-like experiment allows precise manipulation of contracts, informa-
tion, and investment returns to a degree that would be impractical for a natural eld
experiment. Moreover, even in carefully constructed eld experiments, low periodic-
ity, long lags to outcome realization, fungibility of investment funds and measurement
issues associated with micro-business data complicate the use of investment choice as
an outcome variable.5 An experiment overcomes each of these challenges. While
the use of an experiment entails a trade-o¤ between control and realism, I attempted
to maximize external validity with meaningful payo¤s of up to one weeks reported
income, subjects drawn from actual micronance clients, and an experimental de-
sign that closely simulates the underlying theory. This approach builds on Giné,
Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch (2009), which pioneered the use of laboratory exper-
iments with a relevant subject pool in order to unpack the e¤ects of various design
features in micronance contracts.
The core experimental result is that joint liability produced signicant free-riding.
Risk-tolerant individuals, as measured in a benchmarking risk experiment, took sig-
nicantly greater risk under joint liability with limited information. Yet the transfers
4As described in Charness and Genicot (2007), this payment structure prevents individuals from
self-insuring income risk across rounds. The utility maximization problem of the experiment matches
that of the theoretical model.
5Giné and Karlan (2007), for example, were able to randomize across joint and individual loan
contracts with a partner bank in the Philippines. They nd no di¤erence in default rates and faster
expansion of the client base under individual liability but are unable to evaluate investment behavior.
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they made when successful did not increase with the riskiness of their investments or
the expected default burden they placed on their partners. Increased risk-taking was
not evident under joint liability with complete information, and when individuals were
given explicit approval rights over their partnersinvestment choices, risk-taking fell
below the autarky level. Together, these results indicate that increased risk-taking
was not the product of cooperative insurance. They also suggest that peer monitor-
ing mechanisms, as embodied in explicit project approval rights, not only prevent ex
ante moral hazard but more generally discourage risky investments, irrespective of
whether or not such risks are e¢ cient. This may in part explain why we see little
evidence that micronance-funded businesses grow beyond subsistence entrepreneur-
ship. It may also help us reconcile some of the anecdotal evidence on the limits of
joint liability and the increasing willingness of micronance institutions to consider
contracts other than joint liability.6
Equity-like contract increased risk-taking and expected returns relative to other
contracts while at the same time producing the lowest default rates. Increased risk
was almost always hedged across borrowers, with the worst possible joint outcome
still su¢ cient for loan repayment. These results are encouraging and suggest that
equity-like contracts merit further exploration in the eld.
It is worth emphasizing that both the theory and experiment abstract from e¤ort,
willful default, partner selection, and savings. This is not meant to imply that any of
these factors is unimportant.7 Instead, the purpose is to isolate the elements of risk-
sharing, investment choice, and formal contracts and to explore their implications.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model
of informal risk-sharing with formal nancial contracts and endogenous investment
6In 2002, Grammen Bank in Bangladesh introduced the Grameen Generalized System, typically
referred to as Grameen II, which, among other features, formally eliminates joint nancial liability.
BancoSol, a large and well-known Bolivian micronance institution, has moved much of its portfolio
to individual loans. For anecdotal evidence on the limits of joint liability, see, for example Woolcock
(1999) and Montgomery (1996).
7The theory of strategic default on micronance contracts is explored in Besley and Coate (1995)
and Armendáriz de Aghion (1999), while Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) and La¤ont
and Rey (2003) both treat moral hazard over e¤ort in detail. To the best of my knowledge,
neither area has seen careful empirical work in the context of micronance. Similarly, the empirical
implications of savings for informal risk sharing arrangements remain poorly understood. Bulow
and Rogo¤s (1989) model of sovereign debt implies that certain savings technologies can unravel
relational contracts, including informal insurance. Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2000) consider a
simple storage technology and nd that the ability to self-insure can crowd out informal transfers,
with ambiguous welfare implications.
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choice. Proofs are contained in Appendix B, unless otherwise noted. Section 3
describes the experimental design, and Section 4 presents the experimental results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 AModel of Investment Choice and Risk Sharing
2.1 Description of the Economic Environment
Consider a world where two individuals make periodic investments that are funded
by their endowments and possibly outside nancing. Each period, they each allocate
their investment between a safe project that generates a small positive return with
certainty or a risky investment that may fail but compensates for this risk by o¤ering
a higher expected return.
Individuals are risk averse, but they cannot save and lack access to formal insur-
ance. In order to maximize utility they therefore enter into an informal risk-sharing
arrangement. If one of them earns more than the other, she may give something to
her less fortunate partner. In this model, she does this not out of the goodness of her
heart, but in expectation of reciprocity. In the future, she may be the one who needs
help. Such transfers must therefore be self-enforcing: an individual will transfer no
more than the discounted value of what she expects to get out of the relationship in
the future.
Terms of the outside nancing are set by a third party. They specify repayment
requirements and default penalties, typically the denial of all future credit, and may
include income transfer rules ranging from joint liability to equity. The following
subsection describes the model setup and timing.
2.2 Model Setup and Timing
I model this setting using a discrete-time, innite-horizon economy with two identical
agents indexed by i 2 fA;Bg and preferences
E0
1X
t=0
tu(cit)
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at time t = 0, where E0 is the expectation at time t = 0,  2 (0; 1) is the discount
factor, cit  0 denotes the consumption of agent i at time t, and u represents agents
per-period von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, which is assumed to be nicely
behaved: u0(c) > 0; u00(c) < 0 8c > 0 and limc!0 u0(c) =1. Where not required for
clarity, I suppress the time subscript in the notation that follows.
Individual are matched under a formal nancial contract  G that species the
feasible range of transfers between parties, loan repayment terms, and the availability
of future nancing based on current outcomes. The following subsection describes
these contracts in more detail. Then each stage of the game proceeds as follows:
1. Each individual has access to an endowment, I, and a loan Dit 2 f0; Dg where
Di0 = D. Future borrowing is determined by the terms of the formal lending
contract. From her total capital, I + Dit, she allocates a share 
i
t 2 [0; 1] to a
risky investment that with probability  returns R for each unit allocated and
0 otherwise. The remainder, 1   it, she allocates to a safe investment that
returns S 2 [1; R) with certainty.
(a) When the risky project succeeds, individual is total income is yih(
i; Di) =
fiR + (1  i)Sg(I +D).
(b) When the risky project fails, her income is yil(
i; Di) = f(1 i)Sg(I+Di).
2. The state of nature is realized and each individual receives her income, yi.
Denote by  2  = f(j; k); j; k 2 (l; h)g the state of nature, such that for any
state , (yA; yB) = (yAj ; y
B
k ). For notational simplicity I write the four states of
nature as hh, hl, lh, ll.
3. Because individuals are risk averse, they have an incentive to share risk and
enter into an informal risk-sharing contract that may extend beyond any formal
sharing rules.
(a) This informal contract is not legally enforceable and thus must be self-
sustaining. I assume that if either party reneges upon the contract, both
individuals henceforth transfer only what is required by the formal contract
( i =  i).
(b) Each individual chooses to transfers an amount  i 2 [ i; yi] to her partner.
Her income after transfers is ~yi = yi   ( i    i).
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(c) The nancial contract,  1G, species the feasible range of transfers each
individual can make. Formally,  1G : (y
1; y2)! [ 1; y1] [ 2; y2].
4. The nancial contract species the loan repayment (P it ) and the amount avail-
able in the next period (D1t+1). Formally,  
2
G : (~y
1
t ; ~y
2
t ; D
1
t ; D
2
t )! (P 1t ; P 2t ; D1t+1; D2t+1).
(a) Loan repayment (P it ) is determined mechanically. There is no willful
default so if an individual has su¢ cient funds to repay her loan, she will.
P it = min(D
i
t; ~y
i
t).
(b) The loan amount available in the following period evolves according to the
following laws of motion for each formal contract (described immediately
below):
 I : D
i
t+1 =
(
D if P it = D
i
t = D
0 otherwise
 J ; E : D
i
t+1 =
(
D if P it = D
i
t = D 8i
0 otherwise.
5. Because agents cannot save, the specied loan repayment uniquely determines
consumption for the period: cit = y
i
t   ( it    it )  P it .
2.3 Formal Contracts
I consider three types of contracts: individual liability ( I), joint liability ( J) and
quasi-equity ( E), which is equivalent to joint liability with third-party enforced equal
sharing of all income. The rst two contracts capture key elements of micro-lending
contracts that exist in practice. The third is counterfactual and provides a benchmark
formal risk-sharing arrangement, with practical implications discussed more fully in
Section 4.
For each contract I normalize the interest rate on loans to zero and exclude the
possibility of willful default or ex post moral hazard an individual will always repay
if she has su¢ cient funds in order to focus on investment choice and risk-sharing
behavior. Under individual liability,  I , there are no mandatory transfers,  i = 0,
and an individual can borrow in the subsequent period if she repays her own loan in
the current one, Dit+1 = D if and only if P
i
t = D
i
t = D. Under joint liability,  J , if
8
either individual has insu¢ cient funds to repay her loan, her partner must help if she
can:  i = max(min(yi   Di; D i   y i); 0).8 An individual can only borrow in the
subsequent period if both she and her partner repaid their loans in the current period:
Dit+1 = D if and only if P
i
t = D
i
t = D for i 2 fA;Bg. Under the equity contract,
 E, individuals share their income equally such that  i = 12y
i. As with joint liability,
an individual can only borrow in the subsequent period if both she and her partner
repaid their loans in the current period: Dit+1 = D if and only if P
i
t = D
i
t = D for
i 2 fA;Bg.
2.4 Characterization of Informal Insurance Arrangements and
Investment Choice
An informal insurance arrangement species the net transfer from A to B for any
state of nature  given individualsallocations to the risky asset (A; B). Since
individuals are risk averse and R > S, in autarky, both individuals will allocate an
amount i 2 (0; 1) to the risky asset. Because i > 0, there exist at least two states
of the world where the autarkic ratios of marginal utilities di¤er, and individuals will
have an incentive to share risk. I assume individuals can enter into an informal risk-
sharing contract supported by trigger strategy punishment. If either party reneges on
the insurance arrangement, both members exit the informal insurance arrangement
in perpetuity. Note that they are still subject to the transfer requirements, if any,
of the formal nancial contract. I will focus on the set of subgame perfect equilibria
to this innitely repeated game and restrict my attention to the constrained Pareto
optimal arrangement. An equilibrium species a transfer arrangement T (A; B) =
(hh; hl;  lh;  ll) for all investment choice pairs (A; B) 2 [0; 1]2 and an optimal
investment allocation (A; B) conditional on this set of transfer arrangements.
Conditional on individualsallocations to the risky asset, the vector T = (hh; hl;  lh;  ll)
fully species the transfer arrangement. Incentive compatibility requires that in any
state of the world the discounted future value of remaining in the insurance arrange-
ment must be at least as large as the potential one-shot gain from deviation.
In the absence of any mandatory transfers, dene individual As expected autarkic
8I assume that this transfer requirement is mandatory. Alternatively, one could endogenize the
transfer choice such that an individual would only make transfers required for debt repayment if the
amount of the required transfer was less than her default penalty. In practice, borrowers almost
always make such transfers and modeling the choice formally seems an unnecessary complication.
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utility as
V A = u(yAh) + (1  )u(yAl ).
Under the transfer arrangement T , her expected per-period utility is
V A(T ) = 2u(yAh hh)+(1 )u(yAh hl)+(1 )u(yAl   lh)+(1 )2u(yAl   ll):
Incentive compatibility requires
u(yA   A )  u(yA ) +
V A(T )  V A
r
 0, 8,
where r = (1  )=. When formal contracts specify a minimum transfer   in state
, we modify the constraint accordingly:
u(yA   A )  u(yA    ) +
V A(T )  V A(T )
r
 0, 8
where T = (hh; hl;  lh;  ll).
Conditional on the set of insurance arrangements, each individual selects
i = arg max
i
V i(T (i;  i)).9
An equilibrium is a xed point of this problem.
I now show that moving from autarky to an environment with incentive compatible
informal insurance arrangements increases each individuals allocation to the risky
asset.
Proposition 1 (informal insurance increases risk taking) Let T be a non-zero,
incentive compatible informal insurance arrangement with no mandatory minimum
transfers and a Pareto weight equal to the ratio of individualsmarginal utilities in
autarky. Then i(T ) > i(0).10
Note that in contrast to informal insurance and consistent with standard portfolio
theory (e.g., Gollier 2004), when insurance is required by joint liability, an individ-
uals risk taking may decrease relative to autarky. Consider the following numerical
10Note that this proposition requires convex production technology. With production non-
convexities such as increasing returns to the risky investment, greater cooperation may lead to
specialization wherein one party reduces her risk-taking in order to provide insurance so that her
partner can take advantage of increasing returns.
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example. Two individuals with CRRA utility and risk aversion parameter  = 0:5
are in an environment with S = 1, R = 3, D = 1,  = 0:9, and  = 0:5. In autarky,
each individuals optimal allocation to the risky asset, , is 0.25. Now consider the
situation in which they are paired under joint liability and no informal insurance.
There are now three Nash equilibria to the stage game: (0; 1), (1; 0) and (0:25; 0:25).
The rst two equilibria demonstrate the risk mitigation e¤ect of joint liability. In
response to increased risk taking by their partners, individuals may reduce their own
allocation to the risky asset relative to autarky.
Next I show that as an individuals allocation to the risky project increases, she
is willing to sustain larger informal transfers
Proposition 2 (risk taking encourages insurance) For any 0 > ; the maxi-
mum sustainable transfer  (0; )   (; ) in any state  where transfers are made.
Taken together Propositions 1 and 2 imply a positive feedback between risk-taking
and insurance. Improved insurance increases risk taking, which in turn makes it easier
to support greater insurance.
In contrast to standard models of informal insurance with exogenous income
processes, a model with endogenous investment choice has the interesting feature
that more risk-tolerant individual may engage in greater risk sharing. Consider the
following environment: S = 1, R = 3, D = 1,  = 0:75, and  = 0:5. The maximum
sustainable insurance transfer is realized for individuals with  = 0:55 who select
 = 0:42. They transfer, 0:82 or 65% of the full risk-sharing amount in states
lh and hl. More risk-tolerant individuals are too impatient to support additional
transfers, while more risk-averse individuals allocate a lower share to the risky asset.
In the experimental setting described in Section 3, the optimal investment choice for
two individuals with  = 0:4 generates a payo¤ (yh; yl) of (160; 40) and supports a
maximum transfer of 42; or 70% of the full insurance transfer. For individuals with
 = 0:6, the optimal investment choice generates a payo¤ of (140; 50) and supports
a maximum transfer of 26 or 59% of full insurance. Table 2 details the maximum
sustainable transfer for all symmetric choice pairs and a range of risk aversion indices,
and Table 3 demonstrates the interaction between informal insurance and investment
choice, with more cooperative informal insurance supporting increased risk taking.
Proposition 3 (Mandatory Insurance and Informal Transfers) Mandatory in-
surance reduces maximum sustainable informal transfers in states of nature when
11
transfers are not required:  ij(T > 0)   ij(T = 0) if  ij = 0. In states where trans-
fers are required ( ij > 0), total transfers increase if and only if either 

ij(T = 0) < 
(i.e., the mandatory transfer rule is binding) or
u0(yj+ ij)
u0(yi  ij) <
r+ij
ij
.
Figure 2 illustrates three e¤ects of joint liability on static project choice: free-
riding, risk mitigation, and debt distortion. The gure plots individual Bs best
response function for B with respect to A in the environment S = 1, R = 3,
D = 1,  = 0:75, and  = 0:5 where B = 0:4. The dashed line shows B(A)
under individual liability with no informal insurance. Because there is no strategic
interaction in this setting, Bs best response is constant. Under joint liability with
no informal insurance, three distinct e¤ects are evident. First, for low values of A,
B takes greater risk, free-ridingon the e¤ective default insurance provided by A.
As A rises, B returns to its level under individual liability; however, once A > 0:5,
B must make transfers to A to prevent default when As project is unsuccessful. As
a consequence, B reduces her own risk taking. Once As risk taking is su¢ ciently
large (here, A  0:9) the cost of providing default insurance is too great (Bs payo¤
after transfers is states hl and, particularly, ll, is too low); the usual distortionary
e¤ects of debt with limited liability take over; and Bs best response is to allocate all
of her capital to the risky asset.
While information likely plays an important role in determining informal insurance
arrangements and the interactions of micronance borrowers, it is beyond the scope
of this model. However, following Chassang (2006), Green and Porter (1984), and
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986), we expect imperfect information to reduce cooperation
and push equilibria away from the full-information Pareto frontier. In order to
shed some light on the role of information and as Section 3 discusses in detail, all
experimental treatments were conducted under both full and limited information.
2.5 Summary of Theoretical Predictions
This section summarizes the key theoretical predictions. Relative to autarky, informal
insurance alone will increase risk taking by risk-averse individuals.
Joint liability presents a more nuanced set of predictions. Mandatory transfers
from ones partner when income is insu¢ cient for debt repayment encourage greater
risk taking by partially insuring against default. This in turn can lead to free-riding,
where borrowers, unable to credibly to commit to sharing their gains when successful,
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select a risky project and do not compensate their partners for the implicit insurance
required by joint liability. The gains from free-riding are larger for more risk tolerant
borrowers. In response to the possibility of free-riding and default, partners may
reduce their own risk taking, so as to have su¢ cient funds available to prevent joint
default in the bad states of the world. They may also use explicit approval rights,
exogenous and absolute as in Stiglitz (1990) or enforceable through social sanctions, to
curtail risk taking and prevent the possibility of free-riding. Further, we expect that
limited information should weaken cooperation, reducing informal insurance under
all contracts and increasing free-riding. In response, we should see partners using
approval mechanisms, where available, to discourage risk taking.
With full insurance, perhaps enforced through mandatory transfers upon project
success or an equity-like nancial contract, borrowers internalize the cost of coin-
surance. This removes the distortion cause by standard joint liability and should
increase risk-taking relative to autarky. When borrowers have identical preference,
the constrained Pareto optimum is obtained.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1 Basic Structure
This section describes a series of experiments designed to simulate the economic envi-
ronment described in Section 2. Subjects were recruited from the clients of Mahase-
mam, a large micronance institution in urban Chennai, a city of seven million people
in southeastern India. All were women, and their mean reported daily income was
approximately Rs. 55 or $1.22 at then-current exchange rates. Participants earned
an average of Rs. 81 per session, including a Rs. 30 show-up fee, and experimental
winnings ranged from Rs. 0 to Rs. 250.
Mahasemam organizes its clients into groups of 35 to 50 women called kendras.
These kendras meet weekly for approximately one hour with a bank eld o¢ cer
to conduct loan repayment activities. To recruit individuals for the experiment, I
attended these meetings and introduced the experiment. Those interested in partici-
pating were given invitations for a specic experimental session occurring within the
following week and told that they would receive Rs. 30 for showing up on time.
At the start of each session, individuals played an investment game to benchmark
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Figure 1: Timing of Events
their risk preferences. Subjects were given a choice between eight lotteries, each of
which yielded either a high or low payo¤ with probability 0.5. Panel A of Table 4
summarizes the eight choices.11 Payo¤s in the benchmarking game ranged from Rs.
40 with certainty for choice A to an equal probability of Rs. 120 or Rs. 0 for choice
H.
The body of the session then consisted of two to ve games, each comprising an
uncertain number of rounds. Figure 1 summarizes timing for each round of the stage
game. At the start of each game, individuals were publicly and randomly matched
with one other participant (t = 0 in Figure 1) and endowed with a token worth Rs. 40,
which was described as a loan that could be used invest in a project but which needed
to be repaid at the end of each round (t = 1). Each subject then used the token to
indicate her choice from a menu of eight investment lotteries (t = 2), after which we
collected their tokens. Because many subjects were illiterate, I illustrated the choices
graphically as shown in Figure A1. These lotteries were designed to elicit subjects
risk preferences and were ranked according to risk and return. Payo¤s ranged from
Rs. 80 with certainty for choice A to an equal probability of Rs. 280 or 0 for choice
H; the other choices were distributed between these two. Because expected prots
increase monotonically with risk, they serve as a proxy for risk-taking in the discussion
below.
We then determined returns for each individuals project and paid this income in
physical game money (t = 3). Pilot studies suggested that participants understood
11To determine investment success, subjects played a game where a researcher randomly and
secretly placed a black stone in one hand and a white stone in the other. Subjects then picked a
hand and earned the amount shown in the color of the stone that they picked (gure A1). Nearly
all subjects played a similar game as children in which one player hides a single object, usually
a coin or stone, in one of the hands. If the other player guesses the correct hand, they win the
object and are allowed to hide the object in her hands. In Tamil, the name is known as either
kandupidi vilayaattu, which translates roughly as the nd-it game,or kallu vilayaattu, the stone
game. Subjects experience with games similar to the experiments randomizing device provides
some condence that the probabilities of the game are reasonably well understood.
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the game more clearly and payo¤s were more salient when the game money was
physical and translated one-for-one to rupees. After individuals received their income,
they could transfer to their partners any amount up to their total earnings for the
period, subject to the rules of the nancial contract treatment (t = 4). The next
subsection describes these nancial contract treatments in detail. After transfers
were completed, we collected the loan repayment of Rs. 40 from each participant
(t = 5). Willful default was not possible; if an individual had su¢ cient funds to
repay, she had to repay.
After total earning were calculated (t = 6), the game continued with a probability
of 75% (t = 7). If the game continued, each individual played another round of the
same game with the same partner beginning again at t = 1.12 Those who had repaid
their loans in the prior period, subject to the terms of the di¤erent contract treatments
discussed below, received a new loan token and were able to invest again. Those who
had been unable to repay in a previous round sat out and scored zero for each round
until the game ended. This continuation method simulates the discrete-time, innite-
horizon game described in Section 2 with a discount rate of 33%. The game is also
stationary; at the start of any round, the expected number of subsequent rounds in
the game was four. When a game ended, loan tokens were returned to anyone who
had defaulted and participants were randomly rematched with a di¤erent partner.
Subject were informed that once a game ended, they would not play again with the
same partner. Approximately 75% of participants were matched with a partner from
a di¤erent kendra in order to limit the scope for out-of-game punishment. I included
within-kendra matches to test the e¤ect of these linkages. At the start of each game,
we verbally explained the rules to all subjects and conrmed understanding through
a short quiz and a practice round. The Appendix provides an example of the verbal
instructions, translated from the Tamil.
At the end of each session, subjects completed a survey covering their occupations
and borrowing and repayment experience. The survey also included three trust and
fairness questions from the General Social Survey (GSS) and a version of the self-
reported risk-taking questions from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).13 I
12I determined if the current game would continue by drawing a colored ball from a bingo cage
containing 15 white balls and 5 red. If a white ball was drawn, the game continued. If a red ball
was drawn, the game ended.
13The three GSS questions are the same as those used by Giné, Jakiela, Karlan, and Morduch
(2009) and Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick (2007). Back-translated from the Tamil, they are: (1)
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then paid each subject privately and condentially for only one period drawn at
random for each individual at the end of the session. This is a key design feature.
If every round were included for payo¤, individuals could partially self-insure income
risk across rounds.14
3.2 Financial Contract Treatments
Using the basic game structure described above, I considered ve contract treatments:
autarky, individual liability, joint liability, joint liability with approval rights, and
equity. Each required loan repayment of Rs. 40 per borrower and included dynamic
incentives subjects failing to meet contractual repayment requirements were unable
to borrow in future rounds and earned zero for each remaining round of the game.
In all treatments, individuals were allowed to communicate with their partner. While
sacricing a degree of control, I felt communication was an important step towards
realism. The ve experimental contract treatment described below embody the
contracts described in Section 2.
Autarky (A). This treatment comprised individual liability lending without the
possibility of income transfers. It captures the key features of dynamic loan repayment
and provides a benchmark against which to measure the e¤ect of other contracts and
informal insurance on risk-taking behavior. Each subject was paired with another
participant and could communicate freely as in all other treatments. Subjects were
able to continue play if and only if they were able to repay Rs. 40 after their project
return was realized.
Individual Liability (IL). This treatment embedded individual lending in an
environment with informal risk-sharing. It followed the same formal contract struc-
ture of the autarky treatment but allowed subjects to make voluntary transfers to
Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you cant be too careful in
dealing with people?; (2) Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they got
a chance, or would they try to be fair?; and (3) Would you say that most of the time people try
to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves? Dohmen, Falk, Hu¤man,
Schupp, Sunde, and Wagner (2006) demonstrates the e¤ectiveness of self-reported questions about
ones willingness to take risks in specic areas (e.g., nancial matters or driving) at predicting risky
behaviors in those areas. Based on this nding, I asked the following question: How do you see
yourself? As it relates to your business, are you a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do
you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale where 0 means unwilling to take risks
and 10 means fully prepared to take risks. Subject were unaccustomed to abstract, self-evaluation
questions and had di¢ culty answering.
14See appendix section B.1 for details.
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Table 1: Summary of Financial Contract Treatments
Explicit Third-Party
Communi- Dynamic Informal Joint Project Enforced
cation Incentives Risk Sharing Liability Approval Transfers
Autarky (A)  
Individual Liability (IL)   
Joint Liability (JL)    
Joint Liability with Approval (JLA)     
Equity (E)     
their partners after project returns were realized and before loan repayment.
Joint Liability (JL). This treatment captures the core feature of most micro-
nance contracts, joint liability. Members of a pair were jointly responsible for each
othersloan repayments. A subject was able to continue play only if both she and
her partner repaid Rs. 40. To isolate the e¤ect of the formal contract and minimize
framing concerns, instructions for this treatment di¤ered from those for individual
liability only in their description of repayment requirements.
Joint Liability with Approval Requirement (JLA). This treatment modies
basic joint liability to require partner approval of investment choices and reects the
assumption, proposed by Stiglitz (1990), that joint-liability borrowers have the ability
to force safe project choices on their partners. It di¤ered from the joint liability
treatment only in that immediately after participants indicated their project choices,
we asked their partner if they approved of the choice. A subject whose partner did
not approve her choice was automatically assigned choice A, the riskless option.
Equity (E). In this treatment I enforced an equal division of all income thereby
eliminating the commitment problem and the implementability constraint it places
on insurance transfers. Participants were able to make additional transfers, and the
game was otherwise identical to the joint liability treatment.
3.3 Information Treatments
All of the nancial contract treatments except for autarky were played under two
information regimes: full and limited information. Much of the literature on micro-
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nance discusses the importance of peer monitoring and local information,15 and these
treatments were designed to see how information a¤ects performance under di¤erent
contracts. In all treatments, we seated members of a pair together and allowed them
to communicate freely. Under full information, all actions and outcomes were ob-
servable. Under limited information, we separated partners with a physical divider
that allowed communication but prevented them from seeing each others investment
choices and outcomes.16 After investment outcomes were realized, we informed each
participant if her partner had su¢ cient income to repay her own loan. Transfer
amounts were observed only after the transfer was completed. Individuals could not
see their partner make the transfer but saw the amount of the transfer once it was
made.
4 Experimental Results
In total, I have 3,443 observations from 450 participant-sessions, representing 256
unique subjects. All sessions were run between March 2007 and May 2007 at a tem-
porary experimental economic laboratory in Chennai, India. I conducted 24 sessions,
averaging two hours each, excluding time spent paying subjects. As summarized
in Table 5, the number of participants per session ranged from 8 and 24, depending
on show-ups. The mean was 18.75. Participants were invited to attend multiple
sessions, and the number of sessions per participants ranged from 1 to 6, with a mean
of 1.75. Summary statistics appear in Table 6.
In the subsections that follow, I separate the experimental results into two cat-
egories. Section 4.1 describes the e¤ect of contracts and information on informal
risk-sharing. Section 4.2 concerns risk taking and project choice.
15Among the numerous examples are Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994), Stiglitz (1990),
Wydick (1999), Chowdhury (2005), Conning (2005), Armendáriz de Aghion (1999), and Madajewicz
(2004).
16Unobservability was successfully enforced with the threat of nancial punishment and dismissal
from the experiment.
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4.1 The Impact of Contracts and Information on Informal
Risk-Sharing
RESULT 1. Actual informal insurance transfers fall well short of full risk-sharing and
the maximum implementable informal insurance arrangement with full information.
On average, transfers achieve only 14% of full risk-sharing and approximately 30% of
the maximum implementable transfer.
As discussed in Section 2, existing models of informal insurance with limited com-
mitment, including this one, do not make unique predictions for observed transfers.
The dynamic game setting admits a multiplicity of equilibria that always includes
autarky, i.e., no informal transfers. However there is a natural tendency to focus
on the constrained Pareto optimal arrangement, which places an upper bound on the
performance of informal insurance and may also represent the outcome of focal strate-
gies (Coate and Ravallion 1993). I calculate constrained Pareto optimal transfers
using numerical simulations based on individualsCRRA risk aversion parameters es-
timated from benchmark risk experiment, actual project choices for each subject pair,
and a static transfer arrangement with equal Pareto weights. These experimental
results nd observed transfers well below those achieved by either full risk-sharing or
at the constrained Pareto optimum.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7 summarize net transfers from the partner with higher
income under individual liability, joint liability and joint liability with approval. If
risk-sharing were complete, these transfers would equal one-half of the di¤erence
between payo¤s; however, in each case transfers are well below the full risk-sharing
benchmark. Joint liability with full information generates the highest net transfers,
5.3, but this is only 27% of the full risk-sharing amount of 19.6. These shortfalls arise
along both the extensive and intensive margins. For individual and joint liability
contracts with full information, either individual made a transfer in only 50% of
all rounds. Under limited information, the probability of any transfer fell to 30%.
Furthermore, when transfers were made, they tended to remain well below the full
risk-sharing benchmark, as shown in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7. Again, joint liability
with full information produces the largest net transfers relative to full insurance, but
conditional on any transfer being made they still average only 43% of the full insurance
amount. While transfers occur more often under joint liability with approval in 72%
of all rounds with full information and 47% without net transfers were smaller than
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those in other contracts.
This result may explain why we see semi-formal risk-sharing mechanisms, such as
the state-contingent loans used for risk smoothing in northern Nigeria (Udry 1994),
highlight the importance of equilibrium selection, and casts doubt on constrained
Pareto optimality as the focal selection criteria for informal risk-sharing equilibria.
The preponderance of empirical research on informal insurance with limited commit-
ment suggests that actual transfers fall short of full insurance.17 While this can in
part be explained by implementability constraints imposed by limited commitment
(Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall 2002), these experimental results suggest that actual
informal insurance may settle on an equilibrium well below even the constrained
Pareto optimal. One possible explanation, consistent with the results from Char-
ness and Genicot (2007), is that the constrained Pareto optimal may be easier to
obtain when there is an obvious focal strategy. In their experiment, transfers were
close to theoretically predicted amounts when subjects had identical and perfectly
negatively correlated income processes; however, with heterogeneity, actual transfers
were substantially below predicted levels and close to those I observed. This calls
into question the use of constrained Pareto optimality as the focal selection criteria
for informal sharing arrangements. Exploring alternative selection criteria, such as
risk-dominance in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), o¤ers a promising avenue
for future research.
Although informal insurance consistently fell short of the theoretical maximum,
formal contracts and information greatly inuence risk-sharing behavior. The next
result points to the importance of information.
RESULT 2. Informal insurance is substantially larger under full information than
when information is limited. On average, transfers under full information are 60%
larger than those when information is limited.
Theory predicts that cooperation will be harder to sustain when information is
limited. While not explicitly modeled in Section 2, we expect that this weakening of
cooperation will be reected in smaller informal insurance transfers when information
is limited. This result is evident in Figure 4 and the summary statistics presented in
17See, for example, Townsends (1994) study of risk and insurance in the ICRISAT villages; Udrys
(1994) work on informal credit markets as insurance in northern Nigeria; and Fafchamps and Lunds
(2003) study of quasi-credit in the Philippines.
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panel B of Table 6. Empirical support is provided by the simple cell-means regression
 it =  +
X
j
jTj + "it, (1)
where  it is the transfer made by individual i in round t, and Tj is a indicator for the
contract and information treatment. Table 8 reports these results. In all contracts,
full information generated substantially larger transfers than limited information.
The percentage di¤erence was largest under individual liability, where mean transfers
increase from 2.42 to 5.83, or 140%, and is substantial in all contracts. F-tests reject
the equivalence of treatment dummy coe¢ cients between full and limited information
for the individual liability contract at the 1%-level; however, large standard errors
make it impossible to reject equivalence in the other contracts. Wilcoxon rank-sum
tests reject equivalence at any conventional signicance level (p < 0:0001) for all
contracts.
These results are consistent with theoretical predictions that cooperation is harder
to sustain when information is imperfect. The size of this information e¤ect is large.
Net transfers under joint liability increase from 12% of full risk-sharing when infor-
mation is limited to 27% with full information.
I now turn to a specic form of cooperation: transfers made when both members of
a pair have su¢ cient income to repay their loans. These upsidetransfers represent
pure insurance.
RESULT 3. Upside risk-sharing is greater under joint liability, increasing by 40%
under full information and more than doubling under limited information.
We would expect that joint liability and the threat of common punishment would
induce loan repayment assistance when one party lacked su¢ cient funds to repay and
the other was able to cover the shortfall. However the impact of joint liability con-
tracts on upsidetransfers, i.e., transfers excluding loan repayment assistance and
thus representing pure insurance, is theoretically ambiguous. As shown in Propo-
sition 3, joint liability can crowd out informal insurance and thus reduce maximum
sustainable transfers; however, there is substantial overlap in the set of sustainable
equilibrium transfers in all contract treatments. For example, autarky, no transfers
beyond what is contractually required, is an equilibrium strategy under any formal
contract. But while the current theory does not predict the behavior of observed
transfers within the possible set of equilibria, there is intuitive appeal to the notion
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that comparative statics for observed transfers would move in the same direction
as those for the Pareto frontier. This intuition proves incorrect as joint liability
substantially increases observed upside risk-sharing.
Table 9 shows the results from the cell-mean regression of upside transfers, i.e.,
transfers excluding loan repayment assistance, made by individuals in each contract
setting when their investments are successful. Upside transfers under joint liability
are 3.85 (120%) and 2.94 (40%) larger than transfers under individual liability with
limited and full information. These di¤erences are signicant at the 1%- and 5%-
levels. Much of this di¤erence is driven by risk-tolerant individuals, whose transfers
increase by 6.32 (228%) and 6.03 (132%) under joint liability. That risk-tolerant
individuals increase their total transfers when successful under joint liability with
limited information may be expected given that, as discussed in Result 6, they also
take signicantly greater risk. As a consequence, their total payo¤ when successful
is larger and they have more to share. They also accrue a greater debt by requiring
assistance when their projects fail. However, risk-tolerant individualstransfers as a
percentage of the full risk-sharing amount also increase from 9.7% under individual
liability to 17.5% under joint liability. They also increase their upside transfers under
full information, which did not increase risk taking. With complete information, risk-
tolerant individualsnet transfers as a percentage of full risk-sharing increase from
25.7% to 47.5%.
Joint liability also appears to increase upside transfers made by risk-averse in-
dividuals, although this e¤ect is more modest. When information is limited, their
transfers increase by 101% from 3.33 to 6.69, and this di¤erence is signicant at the
5%-level. With full information, the increase is smaller, 12%, and insignicant, but
this from a relatively high base of 6.28 under individual liability with full information.
While theory predicts such a response for relatively risk-tolerant individuals making
high-risk investments, the e¤ect was broadly distributed and suggests the possibility
of a behavioral response.18
It is tempting to interpret increased upside transfers by individuals taking greater
18The economics literature has largely focused on importance of social capital in supporting lend-
ing arrangements. See, for instance, Karlan (2007), Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner (2006), and
Cassar, Crowley, and Wydick (2007). Two notable exceptions are Ahlin and Townsends (2007)
work in Thailand and Wydicks (1999) in Guatemala, both of which nd that social ties can lower
repayment rates. However, sociological and anthropological case studies explore the possibil-
ity that micronance and group lending in particular may a¤ect social cohesion (e.g., Lont and
Hospes 2004, Fernando 2006, Montgomery 1996).
22
risk as compensation for the default insurance their partners provide, but several
other factors call this interpretation into question. Joint liability increases upside
transfers even for those not taking additional risk. Moreover, when information is
limited, transfers do not appear to increase with the amount of risk imposed. Panel
A of Figure 5 shows mean transfers made at each payo¤ level. Note that transfers at
payo¤ levels of 180 and above, each of which resulted from investments with potential
default costs, do not di¤er from those made at a payo¤of 160, the result of a successful
investment in project D, which has no default risk. Transfers are at above 160, even
though the potential cost of default increases with the potential gain.
RESULT 4. Informal insurance transfers are treated like debt; cumulative net trans-
fers received to date are a strong predictor of net transfers made in the current period.
The model presented in Section 2 solved for mutual insurance arrangements with
a restriction to stationary transfers, that is, whenever the same state occurs, the
same net transfer is made independent of past histories. As Kocherlakota (1996) and
Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (2002) demonstrate, a dynamiclimited commitment
model may improve welfare relative to the stationary model by promising additional
future payments to relax incentive compatibility constraints on transfers in the current
period. In practice, such dynamic transfer schemes may be implemented through in-
formal loans as described in Eswaran and Kotwal (1989), Udry (1994) and Fafchamps
and Lund (2003).
I test formally for this e¤ect by regressing transfers in each round after the rst on
payo¤s, cumulative net transfers, and the rst period transfers of both individuals:
 it = i + 1yit + 2y it + 
t 1X
=1
( it    it) + "it, (2)
where  it is the transfer made by individual i in round t, yit is individual is income
in round t, and individual xed e¤ects, i, are included to capture subjectspredis-
position towards making transfers. If transfers are treated as debt to be repaid, we
expect  < 0.
As shown in panel A of Table 10, the coe¢ cient on cumulative net transfers
made is consistently negative ranging from  0:120 to  0:302 and signicant at
the 1%-level. These results imply, for example, that under joint liability with limited
information we would expect an individual who received the same payo¤as her partner
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and had previously received Rs. 20 of net transfers to make a net transfer of Rs. 5.
4.2 The Impact of Contracts and Information on Risk Taking
I now turn to the e¤ect of contracts and information on risk taking behavior. As de-
scribed above, expected prots serve as a proxy for risk taking and increase monoton-
ically from 40 for the riskless choice, A, to 120 for the riskiest choice, H. Panel B of
Table 4 describes each of the eight project choices.
Figure 3 summarizes risk-taking levels relative to autarky across the contract and
information treatments. The illustrated values are calculated from the simple cell-
means regression
~yit =  +
X
j
jTj + "it, (3)
where ~yit is the expected prot of individual is project choice in round t, and Tj is
a indicator for the contract and information treatment. Table 11 presents the full
results from this estimation.
RESULT 5. Informal insurance does not increase risk taking.
As shown in Proposition 1, informal insurance should induce members of a pair to
take additional risk. Using the parameters of the experimental setting, I calculated
individualsoptimal investment choices under autarky and with informal insurance
that achieves the constrained Pareto optimum. The numerical results imply that
constrained-e¢ cient insurance should increase risk-taking, as measured by the ex-
pected prot of individualsproject choices, by between Rs. 5 and Rs. 10, or 10% to
20%.
Comparing investment choices in the individual liability treatment to those un-
der autarky provides an immediate test of this hypothesis; the individual liability
treatment di¤ered from autarky only in that subjects were able to engage in informal
risk-sharing. As is evident from Figure 3, the availability of informal insurance had
little e¤ect on individuals risk taking behavior. Neither of the individual liability
coe¢ cients from the estimation of (3) are signicant as shown in panel A of Table
11. We can reject at the 5%-level increases of 1.2% and 3.2% in the limited and full
information treatments.
Given the relatively low levels of informal risk-sharing actually observed, this
outcome is perhaps not surprising. While the experiments were designed such that
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the maximum implementable informal risk-sharing arrangement would increase the
optimal contract choice by at least one class (e.g., the optimal contract pair for two
individuals with CRRA utility and  of 0:5 would move from the pair fB;Bg, with
individual payo¤s of 100 or 70, in autarky to fC;Cg, with individual payo¤s of 140 or
50, under individual liability with informal insurance), the realized levels of informal
insurance support only a small increase in risk taking.
The available of informal insurance may also have made risk more salient and
thus discouraged risk taking. While communication was allowed in all treatments,
participants in the autarky treatment rarely spoke to one another. Under individual
liability with informal insurance, participants often discussed their project choices
and occasionally made contingent transfer plans. These discussions typically focused
on what would happen in the event of a bad outcome and, by making this state more
salient, may have discouraged risk taking.
RESULT 6. The e¤ect of joint liability on risk taking depends on the information
environment. Under full information, joint liability marginally reduces risk taking
relative to individual liability. With limited information, joint liability increases ag-
gregate risk taking as more risk-tolerant individuals take signicantly greater risk,
relying on their partners to insure against default.
Theory does not make sharp predictions for the e¤ect of joint liability on invest-
ment choice. On one hand, risk-pooling and mandatory transfers from ones partner
encourage risk taking. On the other hand, the threat of joint default may induce
risk mitigation and reduce risk-taking. Which e¤ect dominates in practice depends
on the risk tolerance of both partners and the selected equilibrium of the dynamic
game. In light of the relatively larger amount of informal insurance observed in joint
liability relative to individual liability, particularly under full information, we would
expect greater risk-taking under joint liability. Under joint liability with limited
information, we would expect a more modest increase in risk-taking if individuals are
behaving cooperatively; however, if cooperation breaks down, the free-riding e¤ect
described in Section 2 would dominate.
In the experiment under full information, joint liability marginally reduces risk
taking relative to individual liability. Expected prots fall by 2:8% (1:43). This
result, shown in panel B of Table 11, is consistent with the nding that increased
communication between partners tends to decrease risk taking, but it is not statisti-
cally signicant.
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Under limited information, the e¤ect is reversed. Joint liability increases risk
taking by 3:7% (1:87; p = 0:012) relative to individual liability. However in neither
case is the Wilcoxon rank-sum test signicant; p = 0:204 and p = 0:121.
Within the joint liability contract, the e¤ect of information on risk taking is pro-
nounced. Limited information increases risk taking by 4:3% (2:17; p = 0:009) and
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test easily rejects equivalence (p = 0:001). Large di¤erences
in behavior across risk types drives this increase. Risk-averse individuals respond lit-
tle to joint liability regardless of the information structure, while more risk-tolerant
individuals take signicantly greater risk when information is limited.
I divide subjects into risk categories based on their choices in the risk benchmark-
ing games. Approximately 70% of subjects picked one of the safe choices, A through
D, and are categorized as risk averse.The remaining 30% picked choices E through
H and are categorized as risk tolerant.This division corresponds to a coe¢ cient of
risk aversion of 0.44 for individuals with CRRA utility and a wealth of zero.
When information is complete, joint liability does not appear to a¤ect the invest-
ment choices of risk-tolerant individuals. In fact, as shown in column 4 of Table 12,
they take less risk than in autarky and their project choices are statistically indistin-
guishable from those of risk-averse individuals. This is consistent with Giné, Jakiela,
Karlan, and Morduchs (2009) nding that participants who tend to take risks reduce
their risk-taking when their partners make safer choices.
When information is limited, risk-tolerant individuals increase their risk taking
under the simple joint liability contract. As can be seen in column 2 of Table 12,
the mean expected return for risk-tolerant individuals increases by 26% (1:2) from
51.3 under individual liability to 64.7 under joint liability. A nonparametric Wilcoxon
rank test show this di¤erence is signicant at any conventional level (p < 0:0001).19
Evidence of compensatory transfers is mixed. As discussed above, risk-tolerant indi-
viduals do make larger transfers under joint liability, but two facts call into question
the intent of these transfers. First, as can be seen in panel B of Table 9, this in-
crease appears in both full and limited information, while increased risk taking is
only evident when information is limited. Second, as shown in Figure 5, there is
no discernible di¤erences in transfers by risky individuals who chose projects just
19This result is robust to moving the denition of risk tolerantup or down one risk class. A
fully non-parametric specication for the e¤ect of benchmarked investment choice on risk-taking
under joint liability with limited information shows noticeable break between those who elected a
safechoice in the benchmarking rounds and those who did not.
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below the potential threshold for default (projects C and D) and those who forced
their partners to insure against default (projects E, F, G and H). One interpretation
of this result is that risk-tolerant individuals increase transfers under joint liability
to compensate their partners for the option value of default insurance even if their
investment choices render this insurance moot. Further experimentation would be
useful to test this hypothesis.
Consistent with theoretical predictions, cooperation appears easier to sustain when
information is complete. When cooperation breaks down, we expect individuals to
take action to discourage free-riding. The next result shows that explicit approval
rights are used ex ante to discourage risk taking.
RESULT 7. Explicit approval rights are used to curtail risk taking under joint liability
with limited information but have a negligible e¤ect under full information.
As described in Section 2, explicit approval rights could be used either as a threat
to provide additional punishment support for cooperation or actively to prevent risk
taking ex ante. As shown in panel C of Table 11, the risk-discouragement e¤ect
dominates, particularly when information is limited. When information is limited,
risk taking in the JLA contract is 6.3% lower than in autarky and 8.3% lower than
under joint liability without explicit approval. Both di¤erences are signicant at
greater than the 1%-level. This e¤ect is concentrated among risk-tolerant individuals,
for whom expected prots fall 22% from 63.8 to 49.9. Risk-averse individuals also
reduce their risk relative to individual or joint liability, but the e¤ect is more modest
and only borderline signicant.
As expected, joint liability creates two potential ine¢ ciencies: free-riding when
the enforcement mechanisms necessary to sustain cooperation are weak and excessive
caution when these mechanisms are strong. The next result turns to one possible
solution: equity-like contracts under which full risk-sharing is enforced by a third-
party.
RESULT 8. Equity increases expected returns relative to other contracts while produc-
ing the lowest default rates. Under limited information, expected prots are 5% larger
than under individual liability and 10% larger than under joint liability with approval
rights. While expected prots are only slightly larger than under joint liability, the
increased willingness to take risk is distributed across individuals and not the result
of risk-tolerant individuals free-riding on their partners.
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Third-party enforcement of equal income distribution overcomes much of the com-
mitment problem associated with informal risk-sharing arrangements. As such, we
would expect equity-like contracts to encourage greater risk taking than under autarky
or contracts where limited commitment reduces the sustainable amount of insurance.
This result can be seen in Figure 3 and the summary of expected prots by contract
type in Table 11. Formal statistical evidence is provided by the regression described
in (3). Tests for the equivalence of the equity treatment dummy coe¢ cients against
those for individual, joint liability, and joint liability with approval are each signicant
at better than the 5%-level. Wilcoxon tests reject equivalence at better than the 1%-
level in each case. While statistically signicant and practically meaningful, the
di¤erences in risk taking between equity and individual liability or autarky are less
than we would expect. Numerical simulations based on benchmarked risk-taking
behavior predict expected prots under the equity contract should increase by 10% to
20% relative to autarky. Actual expected prots increase by 2% to 5%, approximately
0.10 to 0.25 standard deviations. Relative to joint liability with approval rights, the
increase in expected prots from equity contracts is more than twice as large, 5%
under full information and 10% under limited information.
Panel C of Table 6 reports default rates for each contract, ranging from a high of
4.8% in autarky to 0% under equity. The low default rates are consistent with the
reported rates of most micronance institutions Mahasemam itself reports client
defaults of less than 1% but since the terms of default were set by the experiment, I
focus on relative performance across the contract treatments.20 Default rates follow
the pattern we would expect. Adding informal transfers (moving from autarky to the
individual liability treatment) reduces default rates by two percentage points from
4.83% to 2.80%. Moving from individual to joint liability further reduces default rates
to 1.35%, or 1.51% when approval rights are explicit. Finally, equity generated no
defaults as increased risk was almost always hedged across borrowers, with the worst
possible joint outcome still su¢ cient for loan repayment. Each of the di¤erences in
default rates is signicant at the 5%-level.
While these experiments abstracted from key challenges for implementing equity
contracts, including moral hazard over e¤ort and costly state verication, the results
are encouraging. Innovative nancial contracts may encourage substantial increases
in the expected returns of micronance-funded projects. However, further research is
20Low levels of reported default suggests that willful default is not prevalent.
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required to understand why observed risk-taking under the equity contract remained
below what would be predicted based on individualsbenchmarked risk preferences.
Based on the results of this experiment, exploration of how social factors inuence
decisions under uncertainty could provide important information on how to most
e¤ectively move from the lab to equity-like contracts in the eld.
5 Conclusion
This paper has developed a theory of risk taking and informal insurance in the pres-
ence of formal nancial contracts designed to answer the questions: How do micro-
nance borrowers choose among risky projects? How do they share risk? And how
do formal nancial contracts a¤ect these behaviors? To shed further light on these
questions, it examined the results of a lab experiment that captured the key elements
of the theory using actual micronance clients in India as subjects.
The experiment uncovered a number of interesting results. First, informal insur-
ance falls well short of not only the full risk-sharing benchmark but also the con-
strained optimal insurance arrangement predicted by theory. This calls into question
the use of constrained Pareto optimality as the focal equilibrium selection criteria for
informal sharing arrangements. Exploring alternative selection criteria, such as risk-
dominance in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and Carlsson and van Damme
(1993), o¤ers a promising avenue for future research.
Second, in contrast to theoretical predictions, joint liability did not crowd out
informal insurance. Upside income transfers, those not required for loan repayment,
were almost twice as large under joint liability as under individual lending. This
result cannot be explained as compensation for default insurance increased transfers
are evident even among those who did not take additional risk. Joint liability may
have increased the perceived social connection to ones partner, thus moving the
equilibrium insurance arrangement towards the constrained Pareto optimum. Or
joint liability may have provided a coordination device that facilitated implementation
of cooperative transfer arrangements. A denitive explanation is beyond the scope of
the available experimental evidence, and further research is necessary to distinguish
the social e¤ects, coordination devices, and other explanations.
Third, despite the apparent value attached to joint liability, when information
was imperfect, such contracts still produced signicant free-riding. Risk-tolerant in-
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dividuals took substantially greater risk without compensating their partners for the
added insurance burden. Granting approval rights eliminated free-riding but also re-
duced risk-taking below autarky levels. The strength of this e¤ect suggests that peer
monitoring may not only reduce ex ante moral hazard but also discourage risk taking
more generally, regardless of e¢ ciency. Combined with the result that informal insur-
ance had a negative, though statistically insignicant, e¤ect on risk taking, this result
suggests research into social determinants of investment choice would be fruitful and
may explain the lack of demonstrable growth in micronance-funded enterprises.
Finally, equity increased risk-taking and expected returns relative to other nan-
cial contracts, although these increases were less than half what theory would predict
for optimal behavior. At the same time, equity also generated the lowest default
rates. While there are signicant hurdles to implementing such contracts in practice
and further research is required to understand deviations from predicted risk-taking
behavior, these results are encouraging and suggest that equity-like contracts merit
further exploration in the eld.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Joint Liability Static Investment Choice Effects
Best Response Function for Individual B: S=1, R=3, D=1, =0.75, =0.5
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Figure 3: Risk Taking by Treatment
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Notes:
(1) Plot points represent coefficients on treatment dummies in the regression
(2) Error bars represent one standard deviation.
(3) Equity transfers exclude mandatory, third-party-enforced transfers.
Figure 4: Mean Transfers by Treatment
Figure 5: Transfers by Round Income
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Full
Choice Pair Insurance 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     
{B,B} 15     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     
{C,C} 45     0     0     4     16     26     36     43     45     
{D,D} 60     5     21     42     60     60     60     60     60     
{E,E} 75     61     72     75     75     75     75     75     75     
{F,F} 90     67     79     90     90     90     90     90     90     
{G,G} 115     81     97     115     115     115     115     115     115     
{H,H} 140     96     115     138     140     140     140     140     140     
Note: Maximum incentive compatible transfer based on equal Pareto weights and homogeneous preferences.
Reflects dynamic borrowing incentives with discount rate of 33%, individual liability debt contracts, and no 
additional formal financial contracts.
Table 2: Maximium Sustainable Transfers
Transfer when outcome is {h,l}
CRRA risk aversion index ()
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A. AUTARKY
Choice Pair 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 23.9  18.9  15.2  12.6  10.9  10.1  10.5  14.5  
{B,B} 26.0  20.3  16.1  13.2  11.3  10.3  10.6  14.6  
{C,C} 28.8  21.5  16.5  13.2  11.0  10.0  10.2  14.2  
{D,D} 28.8  20.4  14.7  11.0  8.5  7.0  6.5  8.1  
{E,E} 13.0  9.1  6.5  4.7  3.6  2.9  2.7  3.3  
{F,F} 14.5  10.0  7.0  5.1  3.8  3.1  2.8  3.3  
{G,G} 17.3  11.7  8.0  5.7  4.2  3.3  2.9  3.4  
{H,H} 20.1  13.2  8.9  6.2  4.5  3.5  3.0  3.5  
B. FULL INSURANCE
Choice Pair 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 23.9  18.9  15.2  12.6  10.9  10.1  10.5  14.5  
{B,B} 26.2  20.4  16.2  13.3  11.4  10.4  10.7  14.6  
{C,C} 29.8  22.6  17.5  14.0  11.7  10.5  10.7  14.6  
{D,D} 30.9  22.7  17.1  13.2  10.7  9.2  8.9  11.6  
{E,E} 19.4  14.1  10.4  8.0  6.4  5.4  5.2  6.7  
{F,F} 21.0  15.1  11.1  8.4  6.6  5.6  5.3  6.7  
{G,G} 24.9  17.5  12.6  9.3  7.2  5.9  5.5  6.9  
{H,H} 28.5  19.7  13.9  10.1  7.7  6.3  5.7  7.0  
C. MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE TRANSFERS
Choice Pair 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
{A,A} 23.9  18.9  15.2  12.6  10.9  10.1  10.5  14.5  
{B,B} 26.0  20.3  16.1  13.2  11.3  10.3  10.6  14.6  
{C,C} 28.8  21.5  16.7  13.7  11.6  10.5  10.7  14.6  
{D,D} 29.5  22.1  17.0  13.2  10.7  9.2  8.9  11.6  
{E,E} 19.3  14.1  10.4  8.0  6.4  5.4  5.2  6.7  
{F,F} 20.9  15.1  11.1  8.4  6.6  5.6  5.3  6.7  
{G,G} 24.7  17.4  12.6  9.3  7.2  5.9  5.5  6.9  
{H,H} 28.3  19.6  13.9  10.1  7.7  6.3  5.7  7.0  
Note: Bold and boxed amount represents maximum per period utility along column.  Maximum incentive compatible
transfer based on equal Pareto weights and homogeneous preferences.  Reflects dynamic borrowing incentives with
discount rate of 33%, individual liability debt contracts, and no additional formal contracts.  Full insurance reflects equal
sharing of all income.
CRRA risk aversion index ()
Table 3: Average Per Period Utility for Different Transfer Regimes
CRRA risk aversion index ()
CRRA risk aversion index ()
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A. BENCHMARKING GAME
Expected
Choice White (High) Black (Low) Round Profit
A 40       40       40.0       1.76 to  
B 60       30       45.0       0.81 to 1.76
C 70       25       47.5       0.57 to 0.81
D 80       20       50.0       0.44 to 0.57
E 90       15       52.5       0.34 to 0.44
F 100       10       55.0       0.26 to 0.34
G 110       5       57.5       0.17 to 0.26
H 120       0       60.0        to 0.17
B. CORE GAMES (all include debt repayment)
Expected
Choice White (High) Black (Low) Round Profit (1)
A 80       80       40.0       6.2 to  3.9 to  
B 100       70       45.0       0.59 to 6.20 1.0 to 3.9
C 140       50       55.0       0.57 to 1.0
D 160       40       60.0        to 0.57
E 180       30       70.0       
F 200       20       80.0       
G 240       10       100.0       
H 280       0       120.0        to 0.59
Notes:
(1) After debt repayment of Rs. 40.
(2) Assumes wealth level of zero.
(3) Continuation probability equals 75%.  Default round income equals zero.
Table 4: Summary of Investment Choices
-----
-----
Single Shot
-----
-----
-----
Dynamic(3)
Implied Risk
Aversion Coeff. in Autarky(2)
Payoffs
Payoffs
Risk Aversion 
Coefficient
-----
-----
-----
-----
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A. SESSION SUMMARY
Session     Date Rounds Participants
1    4/09/2007 5      24      
2    4/10/2007 9      23      
3    4/11/2007 12      16      
4    4/13/2007 7      20      
5    4/18/2007 6      14      
6    4/23/2007 11      8      
7    4/24/2007 9      22      
8    4/25/2007 12      10      
9    4/26/2007 7      21      
10    4/27/2007 9      21      
11    4/30/2007 7      20      
12    5/01/2007 10      18      
13    5/03/2007 12      15      
14    5/04/2007 11      20      
15    5/07/2007 10      20      
16    5/08/2007 15      20      
17    5/09/2007 11      17      
18    5/10/2007 14      17      
19    5/14/2007 11      23      
20    5/15/2007 10      24      
21    5/16/2007 11      17      
22    5/17/2007 9      20      
23    5/18/2007 10      20      
24    5/21/2007 13      20      
B. OBSERVATION COUNTS BY GAME
Game Full Limited Total
Benchmarking --    --    341
Debt in autarky --    --    768
Individual liability 420      520      940      
Joint Liability 352      336      688      
Joint liabilty with partner approval 172      110      282      
Equity 318      106      424      
Information
Table 5: Session Detail
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Limited Full Total
(1) (2) (2)
A. RISK-TAKING (measured by expected profits)
Autarky 51.64
(12.42)
[812]
Individual Liability 50.33 51.46 50.96
(9.71) (13.81) (12.17)
[396] [498] [894]
Joint Liability 52.20 50.03 51.13
(11.85) (11.56) (11.75)
[338] [330] [668]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval 47.88 50.14 48.81
(8.37) (9.63) (8.96)
[156] [108] [264]
Equity 52.82 52.45 52.72
(14.09) (10.70) (13.25)
[284] [104] [388]
B. TRANSFERS
Individual Liability 2.42 5.83 4.32
(6.24) (10.94) (9.31)
[396] [498] [894]
Joint Liability 5.58 7.39 6.47
(13.41) (11.27) (12.42)
[338] [330] [668]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval 4.36 8.43 6.02
(6.81) (7.93) (7.55)
[156] [108] [264]
Equity(3) 4.21 4.90 4.43
(6.77) (5.95) (6.52)
[228] [104] [332]
Notes:
(1) Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observation counts in brackets.
(2)
(3)
In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all partner's 
actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Table 6: Summary Statistics
Information(2)
Excludes mandatory, third-party enforced transfers.
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Limited Full Total
(1) (2) (2)
C. DEFAULT RATES
Autarky 4.80%
(0.21)
[812]
Individual Liability 2.27% 3.21% 2.80%
(0.15) (0.18) (0.16)
[396] [498] [894]
Joint Liability 1.48% 1.21% 1.35%
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
[337] [330] [667]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval 1.28% 1.83% 1.51%
(0.11) (0.13) (0.12)
[156] [109] [265]
Equity 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
[284] [104] [388]
D. AVERAGE NET INCOME PER ROUND
Autarky 47.79
(42.44)
[869]
Individual Liability 49.74 48.37 48.98
(37.82) (37.92) (37.86)
[409] [510] [919]
Joint Liability 52.39 49.03 50.75
(41.87) (32.42) (37.56)
[352] [336] [688]
Joint Liability w/ Partner Approval(3) 41.10 54.18 46.21
(27.96) (38.69) (33.12)
[172] [110] [282]
Equity(3) 48.77 40.96 46.68
(31.29) (29.54) (30.99)
[284] [104] [388]
Notes:
(1) Standard deviations in parentheses.  Observation counts in brackets.
(2)
(3)
Table 6: Summary Statistics (cont)
Information(2)
In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all partner's 
The project success rate for full risk sharing treatment in the full and limited information settings was 37.1% and 46.9%.
The project success rate for joint liability with partner approval was 57.9%.  All equal 50% in expectation.
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Limited Full(1) Limited Full(1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Liability
Net Transfers 1.3 3.6 7.0 7.7
Full Risk Sharing Transfer 19.1 20.3 23.5 22.5
Net as % of Full(2) 6.9% 17.5% 29.8% 34.2%
Joint Liability
Net Transfers 3.2 5.3 11.1 10.3
Full Risk Sharing Transfer 25.4 19.6 32.2 24.2
Net as % of Full(2) 12.5% 27.2% 34.6% 42.7%
Joint Liability with Approval
Net Transfers -0.3 1.3 2.2 1.6
Full Risk Sharing Transfer 14.9 19.0 18.1 19.2
Net as % of Full(2) -1.7% 6.8% 12.1% 8.3%
Notes:
(1)
(2) Full risk sharing transfer equals (own payoff - partner's payoff)/2.
In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all partner's 
actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Table 7: Net Transfers as Percentage of Full Transfers
Information
All
Information
Net transfers from partner with higher income
Conditional on Any 
Transfer
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Limited Full Difference
Information(2) Information(2) Lim - Full
(1) (2) (3)
A. COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES
Individual liability         - -(1) 3.41*** -3.41***
(0.99)
Joint liability 3.15*** 4.97**  -1.82      
(0.88)     (1.95)     (2.08)     
Joint liability w/ approval 1.93*** 6.00**  -4.07      
(0.46)     (2.60)     (2.58)     
Equity(3) 1.40*    2.48*** -1.08      
(0.78)     (0.83)     (0.69)     
B. TREATMENT EFFECTS RELATIVE TO JOINT LIABILITY
Individual -3.15*** -1.56      
(0.88)     (1.88)     
Joint liability w/ approval -1.22      1.03       
(0.80)     (3.21)     
Equity(3) -1.76**  -2.49      
(0.87)     (2.06)     
C. TREATMENT EFFECTS RELATIVE TO JOINT LIABILITY w/ APPROVAL
Individual -1.93*** -2.59      
(0.46)     (2.47)     
Equity(3) -0.54      -3.52      
(0.70)     (2.68)     
Notes:
(1) Omitted Category: Individual Liability, Limited Information;  Mean transfers: 2.42
(2)
(3) Excludes mandatory, third-party enforced transfers.  Including these, total average transfers for
the equity treatment under limted and full information are 13.10 and 14.31.
(4)
In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all partner's 
actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt of Rs. 40.
Session clustered standard errors in parenthses.  * denotes significance at the 10%, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1% 
level.
Table 8: Effect of Contract Type & Information on Transfers
OLS Regression of Transfers on Treatment Dummies
Transferi j j ij T    	
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Limited Full Difference
Information Information Lim - Full
(1) (2) (3)
A. ALL
Individual liability 3.21      6.70      -3.49***
(0.35)     (0.85)     (0.92)     
Joint liability 7.06      9.65      -2.58      
(0.82)     (2.59)     (2.72)     
Joint liability w/ approval 4.70      9.27      -4.57***
(0.35)     (1.37)     (1.41)     
Difference: Joint - Individual 3.85*** 2.94      
(0.90)     (2.53)     
B.  RISK TOLERANT SUBJECTS
Individual liability 2.77      4.59      -1.82      
(0.81)     (0.92)     (1.23)     
Joint liability 9.09      10.63      -1.53      
(4.97)     (4.10)     (6.44)     
Joint liability w/ approval 6.36      9.50      -3.14      
(2.06)     (0.29)     (2.08)     
Difference: Joint - Individual 6.32      6.03      
(4.84)     (4.18)     
C. RISK AVERSE SUBJECTS
Individual liability 3.33      6.28      -2.95*    
(0.29)     (1.74)     (1.77)     
Joint liability 6.69      7.05      -0.36      
(0.98)     (3.22)     (3.37)     
Joint liability w/ approval 4.20      10.14      -5.94***
(0.32)     (0.82)     (0.88)     
Difference: Joint - Individual 3.36*** 0.77      
(1.07)     (3.45)     
Notes:
(1) Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
(2)
(3) Risk tolerant and risk averse classifications based on benchmark risk experiments
(4)
Table 9: Effect of Contract Type & Information on Upside Sharing
Transfers When Project Suceeds, Excluding Debt Repayment Assistance
In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all 
partner's actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt of Rs. 
* Denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and *** at the 1% level.
UpsideTransferi j j ij T  	
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Limited Full Limited Full Limited Full
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Transfers
Own income (1) 0.033*** 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.108*** 0.040*** 0.009      
(0.005)     (0.007)     (0.008)     (0.018)     (0.015)     (0.054)     
Partner's income (2) -0.009      -0.006      -0.025*** -0.028*** -0.013*    -0.024      
(0.009)     (0.014)     (0.009)     (0.006)     (0.007)     (0.052)     
Cumulative net transfers (
) -0.120*** -0.186**  -0.247*** -0.189*** -0.302*** -0.162***
(0.025)     (0.089)     (0.079)     (0.021)     (0.001)     (0.004)     
Observations 396      498      338      330      156      108      
R 2 0.41      0.59      0.75      0.65      0.64      0.64      
Mean transfers 2.42      5.83      5.58      7.39      4.36      8.43      
Notes:
(1) Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.  Includes individual fixed effects.
(2) In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all partner's actions are unobservable.  Players are 
informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Table 10: Determinants of Transfer Behavior
Individual Liability Joint Liabilty Joint Liabilty w/ App.
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Limited Full Difference
Information Information Lim - Full
(1) (2) (3)
A. COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES
Individual liability -0.83      0.30      -1.13      
(0.94)     (1.18)     (1.22)     
Joint liability 1.05      -1.13      2.17***
(0.83)     (1.17)     (0.76)     
Joint liability w/ approval -3.27*** -1.02      -2.25*    
(1.03)     (1.55)     (1.39)     
Equity 1.66      1.29      0.36      
(2.86)     (1.28)     (1.81)     
B. TREATMENT EFFECTS RELATIVE TO JOINT LIABILITY
Individual -1.88*** 1.43      
(0.69)     (1.40)     
Joint liability w/ approval -4.32*** 0.11      
(0.73)     (1.40)     
Equity 0.61      2.42***
(2.58)     (0.85)     
C. TREATMENT EFFECTS RELATIVE TO JOINT LIABILITY w/ APPROVAL
Individual 2.44*** 1.32      
(0.46)     (1.93)     
Equity 4.93**  2.31      
(2.40)     (1.52)     
Notes:
(1) Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
(2)
(3)
Table 11: Effect of Contract Type & Information on Risk Taking
OLS Regression of Expected Profits on Treatment Dummies
* Denotes significance at the 10%-level, ** at the 5%-level, and *** at the 1% level.
Omitted Category: autkary;  Mean expected profits: 51.2
In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all partner's 
actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt of Rs. 40.
ProjProfiti j j ij T    	
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Low High Low High
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline
Autarky 50.18      52.69      50.18      52.69      
(0.94)     (1.41)     (0.94)     (1.41)     
Contract Effects Relative to Autarky Baseline
Individual liability 0.07      -1.37      -0.04      0.47      
(0.99)     (1.68)     (1.41)     (2.28)     
Joint liability -0.54      12.10*** -0.81      -2.84*    
(0.91)     (4.07)     (1.09)     (1.60)     
Joint liability with partner approval -2.58**  -2.84*    -0.80      -0.41      
(1.29)     (1.57)     (0.94)     (5.03)     
Equity 2.91*    0.15      1.32      4.81***
(1.64)     (3.37)     (2.26)     (1.56)     
Notes:
(1) Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses.
(2) Risk type based on investment choices in benchmarking rounds.
(3)
Information(3)
In full information treatment, all actions and payments are observable.  In limited information treatment, all partner's 
actions are unobservable.  Players are informed only if partner earned enough to repay her debt, Rs. 40.
Table 12: Contract Effect on Risk Taking by Risk Type
Risk Type(2)
FullLimited
Risk Type(2)
Risk Taking measured by expected profits
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A Sample Instructions
The following instructions are for the joint liability game with limited information.
Detailed instructions for other treatments are available on request.
INSTRUCTIONS
Good afternoon everyone and thank you for agreeing to participate in our study.
We are conducting a study of how micronance clients make investments and share
risk. Instead of asking you a lot of questions, what wed like to do is have you
play some games with us. The games are simple. You dont need any special skills.
Theyre probably like games you played before. You dont need to know how to read.
There are no rightor wronganswers. We just want to understand how you make
choices and what sorts of investment you prefer.
Here is how the game works. You will play games where the amount of money
you win is based on picking a colored stone. Display large 100/10 payo¤ sheet. One
of us will hold a stone in each hand. One stone is white. The other is black. Show
stones. We will mix the stones up and you will pick a hand. No one will know which
stone is in which hand, so the color you get is based on chance.
If you pick the white stone you will win the amount shown in white. If you pick
the black stone you will win the amount shown in black.
Play practice round and administer oral test to conrm understanding. Distribute
project choice sheets and tokens (carom coins).
We will give you choices about which game you want to play. Look at the sheet
in front of you. It describes eight games. The color on the page tells you how much
you win for each color stone. If you play game Bhow much do you win if you pick
the white stone? How much for the black?
You can pick which game you want to play by placing a carom coin on your choice.
For example, if you wanted to play the rst game you would put your black carom
coin over the A. Demonstrate. And if you wanted to play [the fth game], you put
your coin over the E.
The choice is yours. There are no right or wrong answers. Its only about which
choice you prefer.
You can discuss your choices with the other person at your table, but do not speak
with anyone else. Also, while you may talk with the person at your table, you may
not look at her choices or score sheet. The rst time you look at your partners sheet,
we will deduct Rs. 20 from your score. If you peek a second time, we will have to
ask you to leave the study.
We will play several rounds today. At the end of the day we will put the number
for each round you play in this blue bucket. Suppose you play three rounds. We
will put the numbers 1, 2, and 3 in the bucket and you will pick a number from the
bucket without looking. We will pay you in rupees for every point you scored in just
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that round. Remember, you will only be paid in rupees for one of the rounds that
you play today. Demonstrate example. Remember, every round counts but you will
only be paid in rupees for one of the rounds. At the end of the day, you will be paid
individually and privately. No one will see exactly how much you earn.
Administer second test of understanding.
In this game you will play with a partner. You will use a white carom coin to
mark your choices. When you make your choice, we will take your white coin. After
you play the stone matching game, we will pay you in chips. The white chips are
worth Rs. 5 and the red chips are worth Rs. 20. At the end of each round, you must
repay your loan of Rs. 40. You and your partner are responsible for each others
loans. So to get your white coin back, you both must repay your loan. You may not
look at your partners score sheet or see how much she wins. However, after we play
the stone matching game, we will tell you whether your partner made enough to pay
her loan back.
After you play the stone matching game and receiving your chips, you can choose
to give some of your earnings to your partner. You can discuss these transfers with
your partner. You do not have to make any transfers. However, you are responsible
for both your loan and your partners loan and will be able to continue playing the
game only if both of you can repay your loan of Rs.40.
If you wish to make any transfers, put any chips you wish to transfer to you partner
in the bowl in front of you. Do not hand chips directly to her or place them in her
bowl. Only place the chips you wish to transfer in the bowl in front of you. This is
important because we need to keep track in order to pay you the correct amount at
the end of the day. We will then collect your loan repayment.
Your earnings for the round will be equal to the total amount of chips that you
have after any transfers you make to your partner and after you repay your loan. If
either you or your partner are unable to repay your loan, you will both earn zero for
the round and will not receive your white coin.
At the end of each round, we will pick a ball from this cage. There are 20 balls in
the cage: 15 are white and 5 are red. If the ball is white, you will play another round
of the same game with the same partner. If you do not have your white coin, you will
have to sit out and will score zero for the round. If the ball is red, this game will
stop and we will play a new game. Everyone will start with a new white coin and be
matched with a new partner. After the red ball is pulled from the cage, you will not
play with the same partner again for the remainder of the day. At any time, you can
expect the game to last four more rounds but we will play until a red ball appears.
If you have any questions at any time, please raise your hand and one of us will
come and assist you.
Administer nal test of understanding.
Play practice round.
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B Proofs and Derivations
B.1 Experimental Design and Discounting
We are interested in the individual utility maximization of the form
max
cit
E
1X
t=0
tu(cit),
where cit = y
i
t  ( it   it ) P it as described in Section 3. Because utility is additively
separable and there is no scope for savings, this is solved by maximizing the expected
utility in each round. As described in Charness and Genicot (2007), if every round
counted towards an individuals payo¤, she would seek to maximize the utility of the
sum of income across all rounds,
max
cit
Eu(
1X
t=0
u(cit));
and could thereby partially self-insure income risk across rounds. When paid for only
one round selected at random, an individuals expected utility is
Eu(cit);
where t is the round selected for payment. Thus, optimizing individuals seek to
maximize expected utility in each round, as desired.
B.2 Autarkic Investment Choice
In autarky, an individuals single-period investment choice problem solves
max

U(;D) = u[yh(;D) D] + (1  )u[maxfyl() D; 0g]: (4)
Because of the discontinuity created by limited liability, this problem does not
have a nice closed form solution for a, the optimal allocation to the risky in-
vestment. Under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion utility function,
u(c) = c(1 )=(1  ), the rst order condition for an interior maximum is:
INT =
(z   1)[S(1 +D) D]
[(z   1)S +R](1 +D) ; (5)
where
z =

(R  S)
(1  )S
1=
.
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Accounting for the discontinuity created by limited liability, the optimal allocation is
 =

INT ; if EU(

INT ) > EU(1)
1; otherwise
. 21
In the dynamic problem, individuals solve
max

V (;Dt) = EfU() + V (;Dt)g,
which is equivalent to the solution of
max

U(a;Dt)
1   Pr[Defaultj] .
B.3 Informal Insurance and Allocation to the Risky Asset
Denition 1 (relative marginal utility) For any state of nature  2  = fhh; hl; lh; llg
and transfer arrangement T = f gS, let  = u0(yA    )=u0(yB +  ). Further,
dene the autarkic ratio of utilities, 0 = u
0
(yA )=u
0
(yB ).
Note that the rst-best insurance arrangement involves full income pooling,  =
0 8, and for individuals with identical utility, 0 = 1. Under autarky (T = 0),
the rst-order conditions for optimal investment allocation require (R  S)u0(yih) =
(1  )Su0(yil), which implies that 0hh = 0ll  0.
Lemma 1 (properties of ) For any constrained Pareto optimal transfer arrange-
ment, T = (hh; hl;  lh;  ll):
1. hl  lh;
2. If hl = 
0, then hh = 
0. Similarly, if lh = 
0, then ll = 
0;
3. If there exist  and 0 such that  > 0 then hl < lh.
Note that this implies that an individual is relatively better o¤ when her project
succeeds and her partners fails than when her project fails and her partners succeeds.
Proof. For the rst part of the lemma, suppose hl > lh. This implies that
u0(yAhl hl)
u0(yBhl+hl)
>
u0(yAlh  lh)
u0(yBlh+ lh)
. But since yihl > y
i
lh, there exists a ^ 2 ( lh; hl) such that
T 0 = (hh; ^ ; ^ ;  ll) satises the incentive compatibility constraints for both agents
and u
0(yAhl ^)
u0(yBhl+^)
=
u0(yAlh+^)
u0(yBlh ^)
: This transfer arrangement increases expected utility for both
21In this formulation of the model with limited liability, it is never optimal for an individual to
choose  2

S(1+D) D
S(1+D) ; 1

.
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agents, a violation of Pareto optimality. For the second part, suppose hl = 1 >
hh. This implies that As incentive compatibility constraint does not bind in hh.
Therefore, there exists T 00 = (hh+d ; hl d u
0(yBhh+hh)
(1 )u0(yBhl+hl)
;  lh;  ll) that satises the
incentive compatibility constraints and leaves Bs expected utility unchanged. But
hl > hh implies that V A(T 00) > V A(T ), a violation of Pareto optimality. A similar
argument shows that lh = 
0 implies ll = 
0. The third part of the lemma follows
immediately.
Lemma 2 (symmetric optimal investment) For any constrained Pareto optimal
transfer arrangement with equal Pareto weights, A = B, i.e., both individuals
allocate the same share of their assets to the risky investment.
Proof. By contradiction, without loss of generality, assume that A > B. If
full insurance transfers are implementable, then the individual maximizations with
respect to investment allocation also maximize joint surplus. For any combined
allocation to the risky asset,  = A + B, we can solve for the individual allocation
that maximizes total utility. The rst order condition for this problem requires
u0

A
2
R +

1  
2

S

= u0

B
2
R +

1  
2

S

;
which is satised at A = B.
If full insurance is not implementable, there must exist two states of the world,
 and 0, such that  > 0 . From Lemma 1, hl < lh. If As allocation, A,
satises the rst order conditions for optimality under the transfer arrangement T ,
then hl < lh implies @V B=@B > 0, contradicting optimality. Similarly, if Bs
allocation, B, satises the rst order conditions for optimality under the transfer
arrangement T , then hl < lh implies @V A=@A < 0. Thus, individual maximization
requires A = B.
Proof of Proposition 1 (informal insurance increases risk taking). As
shown above, in a symmetric transfer arrangement, both individuals allocate the
same share of their assets to the risky investment, A = B, which implies that the
constrained optimal transfer arrangement takes the form T  = (0;  ;  ; 0). Note
that for any transfer arrangement, T , the optimal investment allocation, T requires
2(R   S)u0(T (R   S) + S   hh) + (1   )f(R   S)u0((R   S) + S   hl)  
Su0((1  )S    lh)g   Su0((1  )S    ll) = 0: Thus T=T  > T=0.
Proof of Proposition 2 (risk taking encourages insurance). Consider a
transfer arrangement T that does not achieve full insurance. Thus there exists a
state  where one of the agents incentive compatibility constraints binds. Without
loss of generality, assume that agent As incentive compatibility constraint binds.
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From Lemma 1, we know that her incentive compatibility constraint must bind in
state hl, therefore
u(yAhl   hl)  u(yAhl) +
V A(T )  V H
r
= 0.
An increase in  relaxes this constraint. Therefore, using Lemma 1 and similar to
the arguments made above, when A increases it must be possible for A to increase
her transfer to B in state hl in exchange for an increased transfer from B in state lh
that maintains Bs expected utility while increasing As.
B.4 Mandatory Insurance and Informal Transfers
To generalize the e¤ect of joint liability or mandatory default insurance on informal
risk sharing, I consider a slightly modied economic environment. Assume discrete-
time, innite-horizon economy with two agents indexed by i 2 fA;Bg and preferences
E0
1X
t=0
tu(cit)
at time t = 0, where E0 is the expectation at time t = 0,  2 (0; 1) is the discount
factor, cit  0 denotes the consumption of agent i at time t, and u is a common
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, which is assumed to be nicely behaved:
u0(c) > 0; u00(c) < 0 8c > 0 and limc!0 u0(c) =1.
In every period, each individual receives income yi drawn from the set fy1; :::; yng
ranked in ascending order y1 < ::: < yn. Let jk = Prf(yA; yB) = (yj; yk)g and
conne our attention to the set of symmetric distributions such that jk = kj for all
j and k. Denote by T a set of transfer rules f jkg where the choice variable  jk is
the net transfer from A to B when (yA; yB) = (yj; yk). I depart from the standard
framework by assuming the presence of a mandatory transfer arrangement T= f jkg
that denes a minimum transfer in each state. For any realization of income (yj; yk)
where yj > yk,  jk 2 [ jk; yj].
Let v(T ) denote each individuals per period expected utility in the absence of
informal insurance. Thus
v(T ) =
nX
j=1
nX
k=1
jku(yj    jk) =
nX
j=1
nX
k=1
jku(yk +  jk).
Under a set of transfer rules T , As per period expected utility will be
vA(T ) =
nX
j=1
nX
k=1
jku(yj    jk).
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Bs utility is dened symmetrically. For a transfer arrangement to be implementable
it must be incentive compatible in all states of the world. Thus
u(yj    jk) + v
A(T )
r
 u(yj    jk) +
v(T )
r
8j; k. (6)
Rearranging this equation yields the familiar and intuitive result
u(yj    jk)  u(yj    jk) 
vA(T )  v(T )
r
:
the current period gain from defection must be less than the discounted loss from
terminating the informal sharing arrangement.
Let T  = f jkg represent the set of symmetric, constrained-Pareto-optimal trans-
fer rules and consider those states of nature where the implementability constraint
(6) is binding. I now consider the e¤ect on T  of changes to the mandatory transfer
rules, i.e., what is @ jk=@ lm. Dene
 = u(yj    jk)  u(yj    jk) +
vA(T )
r
  v(T )
r
= 0. (7)
By the implicit function theorem
@ jk
@ lm
=
 @=@ lm
@=@ jk
.
First, note that
@
@ jk
=  u0(yj    jk) 
jku
0(yj    jk)
r
< 0.
Therefore sign(@ jk=@ lm) = sign(@=@ lm). Without loss of generality, consider
states where j > k and l > m. For j 6= l [ l 6= m
@
@ lm
= [lmu
0(yl    lm)  lmu0(ym +  lm)]=r.
Since lm = ml this derivative is negative for all mandatory sharing rules up to full
insurance. Mandatory coinsurance in one state of nature reduces informal insurance
in other states. Intuitively, mandatory insurance reduces the cost of reversion to
autarky and thus makes it harder to sustain cooperation.
When mandatory insurance is applicable for the state realized (i.e., j = l \ k = m)
this discouragement e¤ect is o¤set by the fact that mandatory insurance reduces
the current period gain for deviation from the informal sharing arrangement. The
defecting agent cannot escape the mandatory insurance requirement, which serves to
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relax the implementability constraint (6). Evaluating the net e¤ect by di¤erentiating
 in (7) with respect to  jk yields
@
@ jk
= u0(yj    jk) + [jku0(yj    jk)  kju0(yk +  jk)]=r,
which is positive if and only if
u0(yk +  jk)
u0(yj    jk)
<
r + jk
jk
.
For CRRA utility, this implies that mandatory transfers will increase informal
insurance if and only if
yj    jk
yk +  jk
<

r + jk
jk
 1

. (8)
When the ratio of the higher income to the lower income is relatively small or when
individuals are relatively risk tolerant, mandatory transfers increase informal insur-
ance.
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Appendix
Figure A1: Presentation of Core Game Lotteries
